Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937-May 1942. The first of a projected trilogy of what Richard Frank pointedly calls the Asia-Pacific War. This framing is a necessary corrective to the U.S.-centric view that conflates the Pacific Theater of Operations with Japan’s role in the Second World War. Frank’s approach yields a far more comprehensive and nuanced account that better links the Asia-Pacific War to European events and imperialism, a tremendously insightful and nuanced analysis of Chinese military strategy situated within both domestic and international politics, and an equally masterful treatment of Japanese strategy that details the fierce internal politics that drove what proved to be disastrous decisions. Frank not only takes in multiple national perspectives, but also weaves in military operations, logistics, economics, ideology, organizational and national culture, and politics across the bureaucratic, domestic, and international spheres. This is a masterpiece that is of particular value to anyone who seeks to understand the full range of factors that complicate and shape military and national strategy.
Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940. This is a marvelous example of campaign history written by a military professional for military professionals. John Kiszely is a retired lieutenant general and former director general of the British Defence Academy. Meticulously researched and clearly written, the greatest strength of this book is the expert analysis at all levels of operations from the tactical to the strategic. Kiszely is perhaps even better in chronicling the intersection of organizational imperatives, politics, and personalities in shaping the course of the campaign at the cabinet- and service chiefs-levels. And because this is the anatomy of a defeat, there are arguably even more lessons to draw than from a celebratory narrative of a victory. A must read for military practitioners.
Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution. The title is ironic as David Preston persuasively shows that the traditional Anglo-centric narrative casting the battle purely in terms of British errors does not do adequately recognize French-Canadian and Native American skill and fortitude. This excellent study also notes the vital role of logistics in frontier warfare, which also introduced a large measure of contingency— the outcome would likely have been different if battle had been joined a few weeks earlier or later. Yet I found the final chapter on “Consequences” to be particularly impressive. Preston masterfully traces the effects of the battle on British, French, Native Americans, and Americans (as they were increasingly seeing themselves), tracing the tendrils on subsequent military action, thought, and organizational culture.
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Isabel V. Hull provides a finely crafted history that is imaginative in its approach while remaining judicious in its assessments and claims. In short, it is a superb example of institutional history and organizational culture scholarship. For military professionals, particularly those in the U.S. military, the interrelationship she demonstrates between an organizational culture focused on tactical proficiency and both horrible acts and poor strategy is as uncomfortable as it is thought provoking.
Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766. In an entertaining and extraordinarily wide-ranging account, Fred Anderson illustrates how victory can set the stage for future defeat. The Seven Years’ War not only set in motion economic, demographic, and political trends that would eventually lead to revolution, but the very process of mobilizing and employing force to expand an empire created diverging perceptions, understandings, and expectations that would divide Britons from a group that was becoming American. One particularly troubling and recurring theme was the extent to which all parties (metropolitan French and Britons, colonists, and the various native tribes) continually failed to understand each other, even after long acquaintance, and so frequently misunderstood the causes of both success and failure. The tale should be a cautionary one for all who seek to reap rewards from war.
George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Surprisingly, there has been no scholarly biography of this fascinating figure until now. Fortunately, Rory McGovern has filled that lacuna in masterful fashion. This brisk biography not only tells the story of Goethals, but McGovern uses his life to explore the nature of military professionalism at the time. Contrary to what one might expect of one of the foremost engineers of the Progressive Era, Goethals clung stubbornly to Gilded Age notions of "experience is the best school.” In the process we see the extent to which we are all products of our time, holding ideas seemingly contrary to self-interest and certainly not universal in their scope.
The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End. Robert Gerwarth’s chilling account of the aftermath of World War I in the lands formerly encompassed by the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires offers many of the same lessons as Keith Lowe’s account of post-World War II upheavals (see below). This book could easily have been three times as long. The coverage of Central Europe and 1917-1919 is far stronger than other regions and periods, which can, at times, seem somewhat cursory. Nonetheless, this and Lowe’s book are must reads for military strategists and planners with an interest in eastern Europe but who are ignorant of its complicated history.
The Problem with Pilots: How Physicians, Engineers, and Airpower Enthusiasts Redefined Flight. With a pilot's insight, a scientist's objectivity, and his own understated wit, Tim Schultz goes beyond the myth of dashing white-scarf pilots mastering flying machines through the "Right Stuff." Rather the history of aviation is one in which the pilot has often been regarded by engineers and doctors as just one more—and sometimes the least reliable—component in a complex technical system. The two most surprising aspects of this excellent book are how early engineers dreamed of doing away with pilots altogether and the willingness of Army Air Corps and early Air Force senior leaders (all pilots themselves) were to minimize the role of pilots in favor of greater endurance, performance, and reliability for air power.
What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848. David Walker Howe's sweeping history skillfully weaves together the political, economic, technological, intellectual, and spiritual developments into a compelling portrait of a young country still trying to define what it was and hoped to become. Among the many insights in this wonderful volume, two seemed particularly pertinent to understanding our own time: the extraordinary extent to which slavery influenced so many aspects of national life and the aptness of President Donald Trump's likening his administration to that of Andrew Jackson. Furthermore, all Americans would benefit from knowing more about the stresses and strains leading to the creation of our two-party system.
Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield. Brian Linn offers a masterful overview of all aspects—doctrinal, technical, social—of the U.S. Army's wrenching and ultimately disappointing effort to adjust to the domestic politics and strategic challenges of the period from the end of World War II through the beginning of Vietnam. A sobering account of smart, dedicated soldiers who could not find a way to satisfy institutional aspirations within the constraints of their time. Linn particularly shines when highlighting the difference between the intentions of headquarters and what was happening out "in the field." Though a first-rate history, there is plenty of cautionary material of use to present defense and military practitioners who hope to adjust today's institutions. For a more extensive look see my review in the British Journal of Military History.
Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II. Keith Lowe provides an exceptional service to both history and security studies with his detailed, nuanced tour around post-war Europe: France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Ukraine. Peace did not immediately descend on Europe on VE Day. Instead, for years afterward, it truly was the savage continent of the title, as local enmities and hatreds—some new and created by the war, some older and merely uncovered by it—continued to manifest themselves in violence even after the Allies' policy objective of destroying the Fascist regimes was achieved. A sobering thought when one contemplates the future of Syria and other conflicts, where political settlement will only be the beginning of an extended process of peacemaking.
1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created. Read Charles Mann's book with a patient loved one or friend nearby because it is brimming with facts, anecdotes, and insights that you will want to share. For instance, contrary to popular belief that eastern North America was an unbroken forested mass, it was under such intensive cultivation that its return to wilderness as disease decimated native populations contributed to a global drop in temperature. The global and temporal scope of such insights make the title misleading. The book goes beyond 1493 and the New World in exploring the political, economic, social, and cultural ramifications of the sudden interchange between largely isolated hemispheric ecosystems. Mann does so in such an engaging manner that even after 720 pages, this reader wished for more.
Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945. There are few things more dangerous in institutional strategy than reductionist mythology about the lessons of the past. The period between the world wars is an era particularly prone to the caricatures of the “lessons of the past.” For the U.S. Army, the comforting myth is that dedicated officers foresaw many aspects of modern warfare but were stifled in their preparation for war by short-sighted politicians who refused to allocate the necessary resources. Dave Johnson persuasively documents a more complex truth: projections for the future of mechanized and aerial warfare were largely influenced by the past as manifested in organizational culture. Thus, the eponymous fast tanks and heavy bombers developed by the army owed more to the legacy of the cavalry ethos and the ideology of independent airpower than an objective (or accurate) examination of the future. In the process, Johnson provides countless insights into how personalities, bureaucratic imperatives, and ideas intersect in messy reality as opposed to the simple theoretical world that informs much of the literature on military adaptation.